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I. INTRODUCTION 
Upton Sinclair famously commented about his 1906 novel 
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The Jungle, which was based on his undercover investigation of 
the inhumane conditions of Chicago’s slaughterhouse workers, 
that he “aimed at the public’s heart, and by accident I hit it in the 
stomach.”1 The public was far more disgusted by the way their 
food was being handled, rather than the conditions of the 
workers.2 Today, similarly, animal rights activists are looking to 
draw attention to the inhumane treatment of animals by 
conducting undercover investigations to expose animal abuse 
and mistreatment.3 However, these activists are being met with 
state laws criminalizing undercover investigation at agricultural 
facilities, also known as “ag-gag laws.”4  Many of these state 
laws would have exposed Sinclair and his groundbreaking 
investigation of the meat packing industry to criminal liability.5 
And while animal rights activists may be looking to aim for the 
public’s hearts with their investigation, the response by 
agricultural interest groups may very well be creating a 
constitutional free speech issue. 
In 2012, Mercy for Animals released a film by undercover 
investigators, showing Idaho dairy farm workers abusing cows.6  
The video showed the workers repeatedly beating, kicking, and 
jumping on cows, as well as dragging one cow across the floor 
by a chain attached to its neck.7 Idaho charged the workers with 
1. Upton Sinclair, What Life Means to Me, 41 COSMOPOLITAN MAGAZINE 591, 594
(1906) available at 
http://dlib.nyu.edu/undercover/sites/dlib.nyu.edu.undercover/files/documents/uploads/edito
rs/WhatLifeMeansToMe.pdf. 
2. Adam Cohen, 100 Years Later, the Food Industry Is Still the ‘The Jungle’, NEW
YORK TIMES (Jan. 2, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/opinion/02tue4.html. 
3. Jesse Paul, Colorado authorities investigating dairy cow abuse video; worker
fired, DENVER POST (Jun. 11, 2015), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28295679/colorado-authorities-investigating-dairy- 
plant-abuse-video-workers. 
4. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Apr. 6 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-of-farm-cruelty-is-
becoming-the-crime.html. 
5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-70-42 (West 2015).
6. Arin Greenwood, Court Says No To Gagging Those Who Reveal Farm Animal
Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/idaho-ag-
gag-law_55c0b399e4b06363d5a35543. 
7. Lorene D. Park J.D., Criminalizing whistleblower activity in ‘ag gag’ law violated
free speech ad equal protection rights, EMPLOYMENTLAWDAILY.COM, 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/criminalizing-whistleblower-
activity-in-agricultural-industry-violated-free-speech-and-equal-protection-rights/ (last 
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misdemeanors of animal cruelty.8  Instead of looking to curb 
future animal abuse, Idaho responded by passing a law in 2014, 
drafted by the Idaho Dairymen’s Association,9 criminalizing 
unauthorized video recordings at agricultural production 
facilities, as well as obtaining employment by 
misrepresentation.10 
In the recent U.S. District Court case, Animal Legal 
Defense Fund v. Otter, an Idaho judge struck down Idaho’s 
law.11 This is the first instance a federal court has struck down 
an “ag-gag law.”12  The court found that Idaho’s  law violated 
both the constitutional rights to free speech and equal 
protection.13 They reasoned it violated free speech because the 
law criminalized a form of protected speech, and was both a 
content-based and viewpoint based-discrimination.14 The court 
also determined that the Idaho statute violated equal protection 
because it created a distinction between whistleblowers in the 
agricultural industry to those of other industries, and was 
enacted with a discriminatory purpose.15 
ALDF v. Otter establishes a strong precedent that casts 
doubt upon many similar laws in other states. Currently, 
Montana, Utah, North Dakota, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa and 
Wyoming have laws in place that in one or another criminalizes 
undercover investigations of agricultural facilities.16 
 North Carolina has also passed a bill that will be effective 
visited Nov. 2 2015). 
8. Rebecca Boone, Dairy workers accused of beating, stomping cows in video, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.kboi2.com/news/local/Idaho-Dairy-Cows-
Mercy-Animals-173483161.html. 
9. Luke Runyon, Judge Strikes Down Idaho ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, Raising Questions For
Other States, NPR.ORG (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/08/04/429345939/idaho-strikes-down-ag-gag-
law-raising-questions-for-other-states. 
10. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-70-42
11. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943
at *4 (D. Idaho 2015) 
12. Dan Flynn, Federal Judge in Boise Strikes Down Idaho’s New ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, 
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/08/federal-
judge-in-boise-strikes-down-idahos-new-ag-gag-law/#.VhA7r_lVhBc. 
13. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *4.
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Ag-Gag Legislation by State, ASPCA.ORG, https://www.aspca.org/animal-
protection/public-policy/ag-gag-legislation-state (last visited Mar. 15 2016). 
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January 1, 2016, providing for the civil recovery of damages by 
an employer when any employee makes an audiovisual 
recording and uses that recording to breach the employee’s duty 
of loyalty to the employer.17 Notably, this bill is not specific to 
the agricultural industry.18 North Carolina, along with 
Wyoming,19 have established the newest trend in prohibiting 
undercover recording by restricting it on any private property, 
regardless of industry. Compared to its predecessors, these broad 
bans to data collection present a different kind of problem to 
those seeking to challenge these laws. 
Part I of this analysis describes the laws or proposed laws 
which seek to prevent undercover investigation of animal 
production facilities. Part II further unpacks the Otter ruling. 
Part III applies and evaluates the cases ruling and reasoning to 
other state’s statutes to determine how they would fare under 
such analysis. Part IV explores and evaluates the law 
surrounding the broad data collection bans in North Carolina. 
II. HISTORY OF “AG-GAG” LAWS
“Ag-gag laws” come in many different forms, but all 
generally aimed at preventing undercover investigators from 
making audiovisual recordings at agricultural facilities. This 
section explores how the efforts to limit undercover 
investigation on agricultural facilities have changed overtime. 
A. The First Wave: No Recording Statutes – Kansas, North 
Dakota, and Montana 
In 1990, Kansas became the first state to pass a law 
criminalizing undercover recording at animal facilities.20 The 
17. H.R. Res. 405 2015-2016 Leg. (N.C. 2015).
18. Id.
19. WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-3-414(a) (West 2015). (“(a) A person is guilty of
trespassing to collect resource data if he: (i) enters onto open land for the purpose of 
collecting resource data, and (ii) does not have: (A) An ownership interest in the real 
property. . .; or (B)Written or verbal permission from the owner [. . .].”). 
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015) (“(c) NO person shall without the
effective consent the owner and with intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the 
animal facility: (4) enter an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera or 
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statute requires there be “intent to damage the enterprise 
conducted at the animal facility.”21  Montana’s 1991 statute also 
incorporated this language.22  In addition to requiring intent to 
damage, Montana further limited the scope of its statute by also 
requiring “intent to commit criminal defamation.”23 Montana’s 
defamation standard provides that if “the defamatory matter is 
true” or “consist[s] of fair comment made in good faith with 
respect to a person participating in matters of public concern” 
then the speech is justified.24 These two intent requirements 
make Montana’s statute the narrowest in terms of heightened 
intent requirements.25 
North Dakota’s 1991 statute requires no such intent for 
their ag-gag act.26 It plainly criminalizes the unauthorized use or 
attempted use of recording equipment, without regard to the 
intent or what is being recorded.27 Thus, anyone who records 
anything on an animal facility in North Dakota and is not part of 
governmental agency carrying out their duties, or has not 
obtained the consent of the owner, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor.28 Violators may be subject to a max of 30 days in 
prison or a fine of $1500, or both.29In practice, a person could be 
prosecuted for taking a photo of oneself in the break room of an 
animal facility, or any other number of innocuous 
circumstances. However, no one has ever prosecuted under any 
of these three states’ laws.30 
by any other means[.]”). 
21. Id. 
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015).
23. Id. 
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(3)(a), (e) (West 2015).
25. Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber L. Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and The Right to Remain Silent Confront State 
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 31, 34 (2015). 
26. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015). 
27. Id. (“No person with the effective consent of the owner. . .6. Enter an animal
facility and use or attempt to use a camera, video recorder, or any other video or audio 
recording equipment”). 
28. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-04 (West 2015).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-01 (West 2015).
30. Reid, supra note 25, at 37. 
2017] ALDF V. OTTER 203
B. The Second Wave: Forbidding Misrepresentations – 
Utah, Idaho, Iowa 
“Ag-gag” legislation did not re-emerge again until 2012 
when Iowa and Utah passed legislation criminalizing 
agricultural interference.31 Idaho followed suit by passing its 
own in 2014.32 These laws made it a crime to lie to obtain access 
to an agricultural facility.33 
Iowa forbids both “obtain[ing] access to an agricultural 
operation under false pretenses” and knowingly making a false 
statement as part of a job application with an intent to commit an 
act not authorized by the owner.34 Thus, Iowa’s ag-gag law takes 
a different route from the earlier laws as it does not specifically 
target audiovisual recording, only lying to gain access to the 
facility. Utah and Idaho took it a step further by not only 
including Iowa’s language criminalizing misrepresentations to 
gain employment or access, but also prohibited unauthorized 
audiovisual recording similar to the first wave statutes.35 The 
combination of these provides agricultural production facilities 
with two layers of protection. On the front end, it deters animal 
rights activists from applying for jobs for the purpose of going 
undercover, as they could be subject to criminal liability if the 
activists are questioned about their affiliation with animal rights 
groups and they conceal such affiliation. Regardless, if activists 
31. Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal Abuse: Rapid
Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-gag Laws, 48 Colum, J. OF L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 
32. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-70-42 (West 2015).
33. Shea, supra note 31.
34. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015).  (“1. A person is guilty of
agricultural facility fraud if the person willfully does any of the following: a. Obtains 
access to an agricultural facility by false pretenses. b. Makes a false statement or 
representation as part of an application agreement. . . if the person knows the statement to 
be false, and makes the statement with an intent to commit an act not authorized by the 
owner of the agricultural production facility, knowing that the act is not authorized.”). 
35. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015) (“(1) A person commits the crime
of interference with agricultural production if the person knowingly: . . . (c) Obtains 
employment with an agricultural by . . . misrepresentation with the intent to cause 
economic injury to facility’s operations. . . [.]”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2) (West 
2015) (“(2) A person is guilty of agricultural operation interference if the person: (a) 
without consent from the owner. . .records an image [or sound] from the agricultural 
operation by leaving a recording device. . .(b) obtains access to an agricultural facility 
under false pretenses[.]”). 
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are employed, whether under false pretenses or not, they are still 
prohibited from filming. This combination likely makes Utah 
and Idaho’s ag-gag laws two of the strictest in the nation. 
C. The Third Wave: Rapid Reporting – Missouri 
Laws forbidding recording or lying to gain access to 
agricultural facilities have recently fallen out of favor.36 Many 
states proposed ag-gag bills in 2013, but they failed to become 
law.37 Animal activists were successful in rallying public 
opinion and creating a large and diverse coalition to help defeat 
ag-gag laws behind a simple message: “if there is nothing to 
hide, why ban the cameras?”38  Additionally, lawmakers 
themselves raised concerns as to the constitutionality of 
agricultural protectionist laws.39 In response, legislatures have 
attempted to pass statues requiring rapid reporting of any 
instance of animal abuse.  The laws do not explicitly forbid 
unauthorized recording of animal abuse, but instead require that 
any recorded animal abuse be reported to the appropriate 
agency, usually within a 24 to 48 hour timeframe.40 This would 
seem to be a good middle ground solution for both parties. 
However, the effect is that it becomes next to impossible to 
establish a pattern of abuse or neglect, and it enables an 
agricultural facilities to say that a particular occurrence of abuse 
was just a one-time problem.41 
Missouri’s ag-gag law illustrates rapid reporting statutes. 
Missouri’s law provides that when anyone makes a digital 
recording of a farm animal being abused, there is duty to submit 
it to a law enforcement agency within 24 hours.42 Additionally, 
it mandates that the recording may not be edited or manipulated 
36. Shea, supra note 31, at 346-47
37. Reid, supra note 25, at 40.
38. Shea, supra note 31, at 349-50
39. Id. at 351-352 
40. See MO ANN. STAT. 578.013 (West 2015) (“1. Whenever any farm animal
professional videotapes or otherwise makes a digital recording of what he or or she 
believes to depict a farm animal subjected to abuse or neglect. . .such farm animal 
professional shall have a duty to submit such videotape or digital recording to a law 
enforcement agency within twenty-four hours of the recording.”). 
41. Reid, supra note 25
42. MO ANN. STAT. 578.013 (West 2015) 
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in any way.43 Other states which have attempted to enact rapid 
reporting bills include Nebraska, California, Tennessee, North 
Carolina, New Hampshire, and Arizona.44 
D. The Fourth Wave: Broad Restrictions to Data 
Collection – North Carolina, Wyoming 
The latest trend in agricultural protectionist legislation is 
difficult to categorize as such, as it affects far more than the 
agricultural industry. North Carolina’s “Property Protection 
Act” was passed over Governor Pat McCrory’s veto on June 3, 
2015.45 Its purpose is to provide for the recovery of damages for 
exceeding the scope of authorized access to property.46 Damages 
can be recovered when, 
An employee who intentionally enters the nonpublic areas 
of an employer’s premises for a reason other than a bona fide 
intent of seeking or holding employment or doing business with 
the employer and thereafter without authorization records 
images or sound occurring within an employer’s premises and 
uses the recording to breach the person’s duty of loyalty to the 
employer.47 
Under this language, it appears that any employee could be 
subject to civil liability for recording at their place of 
employment. The bill does not identify any particular industry, 
so it appears to be a blanket ban.48  Lawmakers assert that it will 
not prevent whistleblowers from reporting illegal activity.49 
However, Governor McCrory and other opponents of the bill 
believe there is no such adequate protection for honest 
employees who uncover illegal activity.50 Activists have 
criticized the act as just being a way to disguise an ag-gag bill,51 
43. Id.
44. Shea, supra note 31, at 356-61
45. Mark Binker & Laura Leslie, Lawmakers override McCrory veto on
controversial ‘ag-gag’ bill, WRAL.com (Jun. 3, 2015), http://www.wral.com/lawmakers-
override-mccrory-veto-on-controversial-private-property-bill/14687952/ 
46. H.R. Res. 405 2015-2016 Leg. (N.C. 2015).
47. Id. 
48. See Id.
49. Binker & Leslie, supra note 45.
50. Id. 
51. Rob Verger, North Carolina’s Ag-Gag Law Might Be the Worst in the Nation,
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and it is worth noting that North Carolina is the second largest 
hog producer in the United States, totaling about $2.9 billion 
dollars in sales.52 There is also concern that this bill will also 
chill abuse reporting in veteran treatment centers, child care 
facilities, and nursing homes.53 
Wyoming’s statute, which became effective March 5, 
2015,54 is similarly broad in its language. Wyoming makes it 
unlawful to collect resource data on private open land.55 Open 
land is defined as “land outside the exterior boundaries of an 
incorporated city, town, [or] subdivision.”56 While not 
specifically mentioning the agricultural industry, the areas being 
protected are rural unincorporated areas where farms and factory 
farms are likely to be. In addition to the concerns of animal 
welfare groups, environmental groups also take issue with the 
law, as it precludes them from collecting environmental data on 
water pollution.57 
III. EVALUATING ALDF V. OTTER
Idaho’s “ag-gag” law prohibits recording at agricultural 
production, as well as using misrepresentation to gain 
employment at such facilities.58 It reads in pertinent part: 
A person commits the crime of interference with 
agricultural production if the person knowingly: . . . obtains 
employment with an agricultural production facility by force, 
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or 
other injury to the facility’s operations; [or] enters an 
VICE NEWS (Jun. 9 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/north-carolinas-ag-gag-law-might-
be-the-worst-in-the-nation. 
52. 2012 Census Highlights, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Hog_and_
Pig_Farming/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2015). 
53. Verger, supra note 51.
54. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 (West 2015).
55. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(b) (West 2015) (“A person is guilty of unlawfully
collecting resource data if he enter onto private openland and collects resource data 
without: (i) [a]n ownership interest. . .or (ii) [w]ritten or verbal permission of the owner. . . 
[.]”). 
56. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414(d)(ii) (West 2015).
57. Natasha Geiling, Wyoming Made It Illegal to Take A Photo of A Polluted Stream.
Now They’re Being Sued For It., THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 1 2015), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/10/01/3707798/wyoming-data-trespass-lawsuit/ 
58. IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(1)(c-d) (West 2015).
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agricultural facility. . . and without owner’s express 
consent. . .makes audio or video recording of the conduct of an 
agricultural facilities’ operations[.]59 
Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill issued his opinion in ALDF 
v. Otter on August 3, 2015, holding that the law violates the
right to free speech and equal protection.60 The ruling deals a 
significant blow to the agricultural interest groups that advance 
these laws by asserting that they violate very important 
constitutional protections. 
A. First Amendment Violation 
Typically, a First Amendment challenge proceeds in three 
steps.61First, it must be determined whether the speech is 
protected under the First Amendment.62 Next, it must be 
determined what standards of review apply to the alleged 
suppression of speech.63  Finally, the court must assess whether 
the government’s justifications for restricting speech satisfy the 
applicable standard of review.64 This section follows this 
dichotomy and breaks down the ruling into its constitutional 
principles, so that its reasoning may be applied to different 
states’ laws. 
B. Protected Speech 
The court addressed whether §18-7042 criminalizes 
protected speech.65 Previously, the determined it did in a ruling 
on an earlier motion to dismiss.66 The court found the statute 
prohibited protected speech in two ways.67 First, it forbade using 
misrepresentations to gain employment with agricultural 
facilities.68 Second, it prohibited unauthorized audiovisual 
59. Id. 






66. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2015)
[hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”]. 
67. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015).
68. Id. 
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recording of an agricultural production facilities’ operations.69 
The court held that both of these were protected expressions 
under the framework of the First Amendment.70 
Lying to Gain Employment 
In US v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor 
Act,71 which made it a crime to lie about receiving military 
medals.72 The Court found that the Stolen Valor Act constituted 
a ban on speech without regard to any kind of material harm or 
advantage.73 “Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful 
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent 
any evidence that the speech was used to gain a material 
advantage, it would give government a broad censorial 
power.”74 specifically, it would “endorse government’s authority 
to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are 
punishable” akin to Oceania’s Ministry of Truth from George 
Orwell’s novel 1984.75 However, the Court explained that “false 
claims made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable 
considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established 
that the government may restrict speech without affronting the 
First Amendment.”76 
The Idaho District Court held that 18-4072 is similar to the 
Stolen Valor Act in that it merely prohibits speech without 
regard to the causal link to the harm.77  The State argued that 
there is no direct harm from an undercover investigator’s 
misrepresentations to gain access to the agricultural facility.78  
The court disagreed. Instead, the harm that might arise would be 
from the publication of a false story about the agricultural 
facility.79  The court held that this is not the type of direct 
69. Id. 
70. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *5, 9.
71. Id. 
72. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012).




77. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *5-6.
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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material harm that Alvarez contemplates.80  Nor is it the type of 
material advantage envisioned in Alvarez, as the undercover 
investigators were not seeking the material gain from 
employment, but rather the purposes of their misrepresentation 
was to uncover animal abuse and other unsafe practices.81 The 
courts asserted that this is the type of speech First Amendment 
seeks to protect, as it exposes misconduct to the public and 
facilitates dialogue on issues of public interest.82 
The State further argued that the misrepresentation is 
unprotected because it prohibited conduct, not speech.83 The 
court ruled that no reading of the statute permits this view, as 
misrepresentations cannot be construed to mean anything except 
a form of speech, and any interpretation it only forbids trespass 
and conversion is plainly erroneous from a statutory 
interpretation view.84 
Thus, the court finds that these misrepresentations are 
entitled to some First Amendment protection.85 The primary 
focus of this analysis was whether a material benefit or harm 
arose from the lie. It would be difficult to argue that 
employment has no material benefits, as employees are 
compensated at the very least. But, the court seems to believe 
that because these employment benefits are merely incidental to 
animal rights activist’s actual goal of uncovering potential 
animal abuse it is not the type of harm the Supreme Court was 
concerned about, as in Alvarez. 
Prohibiting Audiovisual Recordings 
The court also found the ban on audiovisual recording to be 
a regulation of protected speech.86 The State argued that the ban 
is a regulation of conduct that does not affect speech.87 The 
court disagreed because prohibiting recording would have the 
80. Id. at 6.
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1021-22.
84. Id. at 1021.
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1023.
87. Id. at 1023.
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same effect as a ban on the publication of agricultural videos.88 
Making an audiovisual recording is a corollary right to the 
dissemination of such message, and is therefore protected under 
First Amendment.89 
Laws of General Applicability 
The State argued that §18-7042 was not subject to the First 
Amendment because it applied broadly, not just to individuals 
conducting undercover investigations.90 In other words, it is a 
law of general applicability.91 The State relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. to make this 
argument.92 In Cohen, the Court held that the First Amendment 
did not prohibit a confidential source from recovering damages 
from a publisher revealing his identity when publisher had made 
a promise of confidentiality.93 The Court reasoned that 
“generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment 
simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”94 
The Idaho District Court distinguished §18-7042 from facts 
of the Cohen case.95 First, Cohen involved promissory estoppel, 
a common tort claim applied equally to all citizens.96 Thus, the 
Court in Cohen was simply refusing to provide an exception in a 
generally applicable law.97 However, the court in Otter asserted 
that §18-7042 targeted undercover investigators who intend to 
publish videos critical of the agricultural industry.98 Such laws 
“are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny.”99  The legislative record reflects that it 
was not meant to be generally applicable, but rather targeted 
88. Id. at 1023
89. Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
90. Id. at 1019.
91. Id. at 1019.
92. Id.
93. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).
94. Id. at 669
95. Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1019-20.
96. Id.
97. See Id.
98. Id. at 1020.
99. Id. at 1020 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n., 512 U.S. 622
at 640 (1994)). 
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animal rights groups. Idaho State Senator Patrick likened the 
animal rights investigators to “marauding invaders centuries ago 
who swarmed into foreign territory and destroyed crops to starve 
foes into submission,” and in defending the §18-7042, stated he 
that “[t]his is the way you combat your enemies.”100 Undercover 
investigators were also referred to as “terrorists,” “extremists,” 
and “vigilantes.”101 
The court held that the statute also differs from Cohen 
because only compensatory damages were sought in that case.102 
A violation of §18-7042 could result in either monetary damages 
or state-imposed criminal sanctions, or both. 103 The court held 
that the criminal sanctions place the statute out of Cohen 
analysis, and under the purview of Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co.104 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a state 
cannot make it a crime to publish lawfully obtained, truthful 
material about a matter of public significance, “absent a need to 
further a state interest of the highest order.”105 
Further, the Otter court stated that even if the law were 
generally applicable that it does not mean it automatically 
escape First Amendment scrutiny.106 A law prohibiting 
demonstrations, for example, would not exempt it from First 
Amendment analysis simply because it applies to everyone.107 
Thus, the court finds that §18-7042 is not a general law of 
applicability. 
Strict Scrutiny Applies 
Having determined that both the misrepresentation 
provision and the audiovisual recording provision prohibit 
speech protected by the First Amendment, the court turned to 
what level of scrutiny to apply.108 The court held that strict 
100.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *2. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 (1979)). 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
108.  See Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1023. 
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scrutiny applies because §18-7042 is both a content and 
viewpoint restriction of speech.109 
States may regulate protected speech, but generally any 
regulation must  be content neutral.110 “A regulation is content-
based if either the underlying purpose of the regulation is to 
suppress particular ideas or if the regulation, by its very terms, 
singles out particular content for differential treatment.”111 The 
court held that, on its face, §18-7042 targeted one type of 
speech, specifically “the conduct of an agricultural production 
facility’s operations.”112 It created a prohibition differentiating 
filming an agricultural production facility’s operations from all 
other types of speech on agricultural production facilities that it 
leaves unburdened.113 Thus, the statute discriminated based on 
the content of the speech.114 
The court further evidenced that the statute was content-
based by pointing to the  legislative history and the restitution 
provision.115The record is rife with instances of legislators 
referring to animal rights activists in menacing terms, such as 
“terrorists,” “extremists,” “vigilantes,” and “marauding 
invaders.”116 These statements suggest that the law was enacted 
with the specific purpose of targeting animal rights activists, and 
thus serves the legislative purpose of silencing animal rights 
activists’ speech. Further, the restitution provision, which 
provides for double the loss for any violation of the statute, also 
reinforces the content ruling.117 Effectively,  the only way to 
violate the audiovisual recording part of the statute and be liable 
for damages would be to publish a video critical of the 
agricultural production facility.118 Ironically, the more 
successful that video is in animating public opinion against the 
facility, the more the activist will be punished.119 Likewise, it 
109.  Id. at 1023-24. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. at 1023 (citing Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
112.  Id. at 1023. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1023. 
115.  Id. at 1024. 
116.  Id. at 1024 
117.  Id. at 1024 
118.  Id. at 1024 
119.  Id. at 1024 
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permits a facility owner to recover damages for defamation, 
without proving the constitutional defamation standards.120 
The court also holds that §18-7042 is a viewpoint-based 
discrimination because, in effect, it privileges speech that is 
supportive of the agricultural industry.121It allows job applicants 
who make misrepresentations with the goal of praising the 
agricultural facility to skate by unpunished, while penalizing 
those that wish to expose abusive or unsafe conditions at the 
facility.122 A person with the goal of praising the facility cannot 
be punished by definition under the “double the loss” provision. 
Additionally, since the law prohibits only unauthorized filming, 
an owner is far more likely to permit filming that portrays the 
facility in a positive light, rather than a negative.123Therefore, 
because §18-7042 discriminates between speech based upon 
both content and viewpoint, it is subject to strict scrutiny under 
the First Amendment.124 
The law appears to be inescapably a regulation of content 
and viewpoint. It overtly targets  animal rights groups’ message, 
as clearly evidenced by the legislative history, and the means in 
which they convey that message. 
Fails Strict Scrutiny 
The court ruled that §18-7042 cannot survive strict 
scrutiny.125 “Content-based speech restrictions are generally 
unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.”126 The proffered state interest in Otter 
was protecting personal privacy and private property, which the 
court does not find to be enough.127 The court reasoned that 
agricultural production facilities are already heavily regulated, 
and are subject to numerous regulations governing food and 
120.  Motion to Dismiss, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1024. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *9. 
126.  Id. (citing Turner, 501 U.S. at 680). 
127.  Id. 
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animal safety.128 And given the public’s strong interest in the 
safety of food production, the court did not see fit to afford the 
industry extra protection from public scrutiny.129 
Even if this was a compelling interest, the court does not 
find §18-7042 to be narrowly tailored.130 The court pointed to 
laws already in place that make it illegal to trespass and steal 
property, as well as laws against fraud and defamation for any 
false statements made about them.131 The court did not see a 
need for agricultural production facilities to be afforded extra 
protection when it would burden free speech.132 The court 
expressed concern that §18-7042 not only targets animal rights 
activists, but also fails to protect diligent and trusted longtime 
employees.133If such an employee were to witness and film 
abuse or safety violations, they would face jail time and owe 
twice the economic loss the owner suffers, even if the video is 
completely accurate.134This circumvents defamation law and 
whistleblowing statutes by punishing employees for publishing 
true and accurate recordings on matters of public concern.135  
Because of this, the court saw a disconnect between the statute 
and the State’s interest in protecting personal privacy and 
private property.136 Further, the court did not see a reason why 
counter speech would not be an effective method of refuting a 
negative recording taken at an animal agricultural production 
facility.137Thus, the court found that §18-7042 fails strict 
scrutiny, and is therefore unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.138 
Equal Protection Violation 
The court also found that §18-7042 violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for many of the 
128.  Id. at 10. 
129.  Id. at 10. 
130.  Id. at 10. 
131.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *10. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. at 11. 
137.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *11. 
138. Id. 
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same reasons it violated the First Amendment freedom of speech 
provision.139 
Again, the court did not observe and the State did not 
provide a reason why existing laws against trespass, fraud, and 
defamation cannot adequately protect the interests of 
agricultural production facilities.140 The existence of these laws 
“necessarily casts doubt upon the proposition that [§18-7042] 
could have rationally been intended to prevent those very same 
abuses,” particularly where such action is out of desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group.141 The State argues that agricultural 
facilities deserve more protection because they are a major part 
of Idaho’s economy, and are often targets of undercover 
investigations.142 The court found this logic to be unconvincing, 
as larger industries do not deserve more protection than smaller 
industries and there is not a legitimate government interest in 
protecting a powerful industry, which produces the public’s food 
supply, from public scrutiny.143 Because there was not a 
legitimate reason for §18-7042, the Otter court held that it could 
not even pass rational basis review.144 
The State argued that §18-7042 cannot violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because it did not create an impermissible 
classification.145 An improper classification may be created in 
three ways: showing the law discriminates on its face; showing 
that the law is applied in a discriminatory manner; or by 
showing that the law was enacted with discriminatory 
purpose.146The court found that law discriminates both on its 
face and by its purpose.147 §18-7042 discriminates on its face 
because it discriminates between whistleblowers in the 
agricultural industry and whistleblowers in other industries.148It 
discriminated in its purpose because it was enacted with the 
139.  Id. at 12. 
140.  Id. at 12. 
141.  Id. at 12-13 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 
(1973)). 
142.  Id. at 12. 
143.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *12. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. at 13. 
146.  Id. at 13 (citing Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
147.  Id. at 13. 
148.  Id. at 13. 
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discriminatory to silence animal rights activists who conduct 
undercover investigations in the agricultural industry.149 
The court also emphasized that when a state discriminates 
based on the exercise of fundamental right, strict scrutiny may 
apply.150 §18-7042 discriminated based on the content of 
speech.151 “Under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention 
the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of 
a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, and  deny use 
to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial 
views.”152 Thus, §18-7042 cannot stand under the Equal 
Protection Clause because it classifies activities protected by the 
First Amendment based on content.153 The Otter court did not 
explicitly hold that strict scrutiny applied, likely because it was 
unnecessary as they held the statute was not even permissible 
under rational basis.  Clearly, the district court wanted to send a 
strong message that it believes such laws are highly 
unconstitutional and are bad policy. It plainly does this by ruling 
§18-7042 cannot even pass the minimal burden of rational basis
review. 
In sum, the Otter held that §18-7042 violates both the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  The case is currently on appeal to 
the 9th Circuit.154  If upheld, this challenge could establish 
significant precedent to challenge “ag-gag” laws in other states. 
Regardless of the outcome, Ottter’s reasoning could still have 
implications in other jurisdictions. The following section 
explores that possibility. 
IV. APPLYING THE RULING
The ruling in Otter casts doubt up on many states’ “ag-gag” 
laws, particularly those that criminalize misrepresentations to 
gain access and audiovisual recordings on agricultural facilities, 
as the Idaho law did. However, applying the Otter decision to 
149. Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *13; See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
150.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *13 (citing City of Cleburne, TX. v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440). 
151.  See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text. 
152.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *13 (citing Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
153.  Id. at 14. 
154.  ALDF et al. v. Wasden, No. 15-35950 (9th Cir. filed Dec. 14, 2015). 
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“ag-gag” laws requiring rapid reporting or are broad ban type 
statutes is not as straightforward because they are fundamentally 
different from the earlier ag-gag laws. 
A. No Recording Statutes 
The Otter ruling applies fairly significantly to states’ 
statutes forbidding audiovisual recording on agricultural 
production facilities, as the overturned Idaho statute also 
explicitly banned recording.155 However, a key difference 
between the first wave states’ statutes is that Idaho’s statute 
forbids both unauthorized audiovisual recording on, and lying to 
gain access to, agricultural production facilities156, whereas the 
first wave of ag-gag statutes, only forbid unauthorized 
audiovisual recording.157 Additionally, the first wave statutes 
vary from each other and the Idaho statute as to the  level of 
intent required for a violation.158 
Montana, Kansas 
Montana’s statute makes it a crime “to enter an animal 
facility to take pictures by photograph, video, camera, or other 
means with the intent to commit criminal defamation” without 
the authorization of the owner and with intent to damage the 
enterprise.159 Under the Otter ruling and reasoning, Montana’s 
statute is closer to being content neutral, but is still likely 
viewpoint-based discrimination. Unlike Idaho’s statute, 
Montana’s statute does not limits its scope to the “agricultural 
facilities’ operations,”160 but rather it extends to all audiovisual 
recordings on the facility.161 This was a major point of 
contention for the court because it differentiates based on the 
content of speech by forbidding audiovisual recording of only 
155.  IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015). 
156.  Id. 
157.  See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. 
158. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042 (West 2015); supra notes 19-28 and 
accompanying text. 
159.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(3)(e) (West 2015) 
160.  IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-7042(d) (West 2015). 
161. See  MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015). 
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certain areas of agricultural production facilities.162 However, 
Montana’s statute similarly bases recovery on the amount of 
damages that occur,163 which would likely be the result of a 
negative publication.164 Thus, Montana’s statute is a content-
based discrimination in that regard. 
Montana’s statute would likely be viewpoint discrimination 
under Otter, because it specifically punishes speech that is 
unpraiseworthy of an agricultural facility due to its intent to 
damage language. Meanwhile, it leaves unpunished speech that 
would praise the facility and its practices.165 Indeed, similar to 
Otter, the owner has the right to approve any recording, and it is 
unlikely that an owner would approve of an audiovisual 
recording that portrays the facility in a negative light.166 The 
statute by its term cannot simply be applied to someone who 
would portray the facility in a positive light; it could only apply 
to someone with the intent to damage the facility. Arguably that 
is the point a defamation suit, to stop untruthful, negative view 
of a person or entity. It is harder to argue that defamation applies 
to an unaltered, unfabricated audiovisual recording. Thus, the 
statute would likely be subject to strict scrutiny under the 
framework First Amendment because it differentiates between 
positive and negative viewpoints. 
The Kansas statue excludes the criminal defamation 
standard present in the Montana statute, but includes the same 
“intent damage the enterprise” language.167 It similarly does not 
single out a type of recording forbidden on agricultural 
facilities.168 The listed violation level, a class A, nonperson 
misdemeanor, has been repealed,169 but the punishment was 
formerly no more than a year in jail or a fine not exceeding 
$2500, or both.170 So, the punishment was not based upon the 
amount of damages caused and would not be affected, at least 
162.  See supra notes 102-6 and accompanying text. 
163.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104 (West 2015). 
164.  See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
165.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2015). 
166.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
167.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-
103(2)(e) (West 2015). 
168.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2015). 
169.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4502 (West 2015). 
170.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4503a available at 
http://law.justia.com/codes/kansas/2006/chapter21/statute_11828.html. 
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from statutory view, by the amount of damages resulting from a 
publication. This makes the Kansas’ statute fairly content 
neutral under the analysis of Otter. Yet, the intent to damage 
language, likely makes this statute a viewpoint-based 
discrimination for the same reasons it did for Montana’s 
statute.171 Thus, Kansas’ statute would likely be subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
North Dakota 
The North Dakota statute is more akin to the Idaho statute 
in that neither requires a specific intent.172 Idaho does have the 
broader intent language by requiring that person knowingly 
violated statute, however, the North Dakota statute is completely 
devoid of intent language,173 making it look more like a strict-
liability offense. 
North Dakota’s statute is not likely a content-based 
restriction. It does not single out any particular part of 
agricultural production facilities; it appears to be a ban on all 
unauthorized recording.174 The punishment is not based on 
restitution for the damages that would flow from a negative 
publication, instead the listed punishment level is a class B 
misdemeanor,175 which is punishable by a maximum penalty of 
thirty-day imprisonment, a fine $1500, or both.176 Thus, the 
statute appears to be content neutral. 
North Dakota’s statute may also be viewpoint neutral. It 
does not appear to differentiate between positive and negative 
viewpoints through its punishments, as the Idaho statute.177 It 
does not limit enforcement to only those with intent to damage 
as the Montana and Kansas statutes do either.178 However, it still 
allows the owner to authorize what may and may not be 
171.  See supra text accompanying note 158. 
172.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015). 
173.  Id.; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015). 
174.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015). 
175.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-04 (West 2015). 
176.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32.01(6) (West 2015). 
177.  Supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
178.  Supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. 
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recorded.179 The court in Otter was concerned with turning 
agricultural facility owners into “state-backed” censors,180 but it 
is unclear if this factor alone is enough to make it a viewpoint 
discrimination. It relies on the reasonable assumption that an 
agricultural facility owner would not approve of recordings 
which would portray a facility in a negative light.181 Thus, North 
Dakota’s statute seems to be the closest in avoiding strict 
scrutiny as to the free speech challenge among the first wave of 
ag-gag laws. 
B. Statutes Criminalizing Misrepresentation 
The Idaho statute overturned in Otter was part of the 
second wave of ag-gag laws, along with Iowa and Utah that 
included a provision criminalizing misrepresentations to gain 
access to agricultural facilities.182 Iowa’s statute focuses only on 
misrepresentations used to gain access to agricultural production 
facilities, whether part of an employment application or 
otherwise.183 However, Utah and Idaho not only make it a crime 
to make a misrepresentation to gain access to an agricultural 
production facility, but also to make an audiovisual recording on 
the premises.184 The constitutionality of the Iowa and Utah’s 
statutes depends largely upon whether misrepresentations are 
protected speech. The Otter court found the “misrepresentation 
to gain employment” provision of the Idaho statute to be 
protected speech because the misrepresentation is not linked to 
the envisioned direct harm done by it, or the material advantage 
gained.185 
Indeed, the same analysis used in Otter can apply to Iowa 
and Utah’s statutes. The material harm would not arise from an 
animal investigator lying to gain employment.186 Rather, the 
harm would be from the publication of those recordings, which 
179.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2015). 
180.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *9. 
181.  See id. 
182.  Supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
183. See IOWA CODE ANN.  § 717A.3A. (West 2015 
184.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
112(2) (West 2015). 
185.  See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
186.  See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
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the Otter court argues, is not the direct type of material harm 
required to prohibit speech.187 The court in Otter argues that the 
material gain is different in these cases from the type in Alvarez, 
where it was stated that false claims “made to secure money or 
other valuable consideration, say offers of employment,” are not 
protected.188 The court states that what is sought and obtained by 
animal rights activists’ misrepresentations is being able to 
record, undercover, at animal production facilities, not the 
material gains of employment.189 Given the indirectness of the 
harm and gain, Iowa and Utah’s statutes likely criminalize 
protected speech similar to the Idaho statute. 
However, Iowa and Utah’s statutes are likely closer to 
avoiding strict scrutiny because their punishments are not linked 
to the damages a negative publication would cause like the 
Idaho statute did with language providing for an award “twice 
the value of the damage resulting from a violation.”190 A 
violation of the Utah and the Iowa code would only result in a 
fine and/or prison time.191 This means a violation would not 
discriminate between the content of a message. Any 
unauthorized recording would be equally punishable. Thus, it is 
likely a content neutral law. The only possible viewpoint 
discrimination would be that it allows the owner to authorize 
what recording is permissible, and again it is unlikely that he 
would authorize any recording that portrays the facility in a 
negative light. It is unclear whether this alone could establish a 
viewpoint-discrimination argument, therefore Utah and Iowa 
may be able to avoid strict scrutiny based on the logic of the 
Otter ruling. 
C. Rapid Reporting Statutes 
It is difficult to compare rapid reporting statutes to the 
Idaho statute or any of the other first or second wave “ag-gag” 
statutes because they are so fundamentally different in the way 
187.  See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
188.  Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at *6. 
189.  Id. 
190.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(4) (West 2015). 
191.  IOWA CODE ANN. 903.1 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-204 (West 
2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-301 (West 2015). 
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they attempt to limit recording at agricultural facilities. Indeed, 
laws which impose a duty to report are exceedingly rare, usually 
only reserved for serious felonies such as child abuse.192 
Missouri’s statute provides that when “[anyone] makes a digital 
recording of what he or she believes to depict a farm animal 
subjected to abuse or neglect. . .[there is] a duty to submit such 
videotape or digital recording with twenty-four hours.”193 No 
such provision expressly prohibiting audiovisual recordings or 
lying to gain access to agricultural facilities is present.194As 
such, the constitutional free speech analysis of Otter does not 
significantly apply. 
However, rapid reporting statutes may be vulnerable to an 
Equal Protection claim because it singles out the agricultural 
industry for special protection and treatment. As such, the 
statute may create an improper classification on its face, by 
providing a protection to an industry which others do not enjoy. 
However, it is unclear whether a court would apply any 
increased level of scrutiny. Animal investigators are not 
considered a suspect class. The only argument for would be that 
it is discriminated based on the exercise of fundamental right, as 
was argued in Otter.195 
Rapid reporting statutes prevent animal investigators from 
compiling a record of evidence because the statute requires that 
they report the first instance of abuse almost immediately, likely 
outing themselves as an investigator because the agency 
receiving the recording will undoubtedly contact the facility 
about the violation. This makes it next to impossible to establish 
a pattern of abuse.196 Agricultural facility owners will not face 
tough consequences, as they probably will only be fined small 
amounts or have to fire some employees.197 There will not be 
large economic penalties that act as deterrents as there have been 
with the higher profile investigations.198 Thus, the agricultural 
industry is shielded in that regard where as other industries may 
not be. The agricultural industry is subject to more public 
192.  Shea, supra note 31, at 364. 
193.  MO ANN. STAT. 578.013 (West 2015). 
194.  Id. 
195.  Supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text 
196.  Shea, supra note 31, at 339. 
197.  Shea, supra note 31, at 364. 
198.  Shea, supra note 31, at 364. 
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scrutiny than other industries, but as the court points out in 
Otter, this does not mean it should be offered more protection, 
as food production is a matter of public interest.199 Even so, 
rapid reporting statutes appear to be the closest type of “ag-gag” 
law that can avoid strict scrutiny. 
D. Broad Bans to Data Collection 
North Carolina’s statute, which became effective on 
January 1, 2016,200 illustrates the new trend in limiting 
undercover investigative reporting. Undercover investigations of 
North Carolina’s agricultural and food industry have had a 
major impact in the recent past.201 Famously, in 1992, two 
undercover reporters working for ABC posed as employees at 
Food Lion supermarkets in North Carolina.202 The reporters 
secretly recorded unsanitary food handling practices, and later 
used the footage in a broadcast report on PrimeTime Live.203 The 
Fourth Circuit found that the reporters breached their duty of 
loyalty to Food Lion by surreptitiously filming these practices 
with adverse intent to serve another employer.204 More recently, 
in 2012, an undercover investigator exposed animal abuse on a 
Butterball turkey farm, resulting in six workers being charged in 
addition to a state worker who tipped off the facility before it 
was raided by authorities.205 Butterball accounts for about 
twenty percent of the turkey production in the US.206 Seemingly 
in response to the Butterball investigation, a bill was introduced 
in 2013 in the North Carolina Senate, which criminalized lying 
to gain access and audiovisual recording at any employer’s 
199.  Supra note 133-134 and accompanying text. 
200.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2 (West 2015). 
201.  See Greg Toppo, N.C. poultry worker arrested after video shows him stomping, 
throwing chickens, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2015) 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/09/mercy-for-animals-north-carolina-
chicken-processing-abuse/77049796/. 
202.  Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. at 516. 
205.  Cindy Galli, Butterball Workers Arrested on Animal Cruelty Charges, ABC 
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2012) http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/butterball-workers-arrested-animal-
cruelty-charges/story?id=15637180 . 
206.  Id. 
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facility.207 This bill was not passed by adjournment of the 2013 
session, effectively defeating the bill.208 It is against this 
backdrop that North Carolina’s property protection act came to 
pass. 
North Carolina’s property protection act prohibits an 
employee from intentionally entering nonpublic areas for a 
reason “other than seeking or holding employment”, and then 
without authorization, “recording images or sounds occurring in 
the premises”, and using those sounds to breach the person’s 
duty of loyalty to the employer.209 This provision seeks to limit 
undercover investigations by those who have taken a job to 
record images, as their intent will always to some degree be 
related to their investigation. Representative John Szoka, a 
primary sponsor of the bill, stated that it protects 
whistleblowers, but at the same time targets employees who are 
hired under false pretenses, and seek to record breaking their 
duty of loyalty to the employer.210 
Setting aside undercover investigators, it is very unclear 
how this law protects whistleblowers. There seems to be two 
possibilities: the intent language211 and the protections vaguely 
pointing to other areas of law.212 First, the intent language may 
protect employee whistleblower when the recording pertains to 
the employee’s job, as employees undoubtedly have reason to 
enter nonpublic areas when it pertains to their job. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that this would always protect the 
employee. An employee could become aware of an illegal act 
his employer is doing in a different area, not a part of 
employee’s job. If the employee wanted to expose this, it 
appears he could be liable under the statute. Second, the statute 
vaguely states that that it does not diminish protections provided 
to employees under “Article 21 of Chapter 95 or Article 14 of 
207.  S. Res. 648, 2012-2013 Legis. (N.C. 2013). 
208. Bydan Flynn, 2013 Legislative Season Ends with ‘Ag-Gag’ Bills Defeated in 11 
States, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 30, 2013) 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/07/2013-legislative-season-ends-with-ag-gag-bills-
defeated-in-11-states/#.Vp7N1CorKhc. 
209.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(b)(2) (West 2015). 
210.  NC House debate 4-22-2015 at1:17:20 available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2015-
2016%20Session/Audio%20Archives/2015/04-22-2015.mp3. 
211.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(b)(2) (West 2015). 
212.   N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(e) (West 2015). 
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Chapter 126 of the General Statutes, nor may any party who is 
covered by these articles be liable under this section.”213 Article 
14 of Chapter 126 of the General Statutes refers to 
whistleblowing in the public matters, and has nothing to do with 
cases of private enterprise whistleblowing.214 Article 21 of 
Chapter 95 lists a number of types of employees whom may not 
be discriminated against if they do certain acts or have certain 
characteristics , meaning they cannot be fired or other 
employment action be taken bases upon those acts or 
characteristics. However, none of these preclude an employee 
being sued for whistleblowing.215 
When read with the last part of the vague exceptions 
section, “nor may any party who is covered by these articles be 
liable under this section” this becomes even more baffling. Take 
for example, NC ST § 95-28.1 listed under Article 21 of Chapter 
95.216 NC ST § 95-28.1 provides that employers shall not 
discriminate making employment decisions on account of the 
fact a person possesses the sickle cell trait. So, since this 
“covers” people with the sickle cell trait, it appears that people 
with sickle cell anemia could not be found liable under North 
Carolina’s property protection act, and could conceivably do any 
undercover investigation they desired without repercussion. 
Leaving aside this anecdote, it emphasizes that parts of this bill 
are poorly conceived. 
A few key points which played a part in overturning 
Idaho’s ag-gag law in Otter are also present in North Carolina’s 
property protection act. First, the punishment of the North 
Carolina’s act is based upon how much damage is caused to the 
business, as the remedy it provides for is compensatory 
damages.217 Much like Idaho’s law,218 the only conceivable way 
to damage and thus owe compensatory damages to a business is 
by recording something on the premises critical of the business 
somehow injuring the business’ reputation and costing it money. 
A video praising a business would not cost them money, or 
213.  Id. 
214.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 126-14 (West 2015). 
215.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-21-241 (West 2015). 
216.  Id. 
217.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99A-2(d)(2) (West 2015). 
218.  See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
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trigger compensatory damages in any conceivable way. 
Therefore, this is a viewpoint discrimination because through its 
punishment it permits one view while silencing another. 
Viewpoint discrimination is subject to the most exacting 
scrutiny, and is rarely permissible. 
Second, while not explicit in the text of the statute, there is 
ample external evidence that suggests that the statute was 
enacted with purpose of protecting the agricultural industry. The 
biggest piece of evidence would simply be the environment that 
gave rise to the bill.219 Governor McCrory in his veto message 
was concerned that bill did not give adequate protection to 
“honest employees,” but remarked that undercover investigation 
was indeed a problem in the agricultural industry in particular.220 
North Carolina’s property protection act is likely subject to 
strict scrutiny under the reasoning of the Otter ruling because 
the damages are based upon the publication being negative, and 
there is ample evidence to suggest that this is a veiled attempt at 
targeting animal rights activists. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rapid reporting statutes and content and viewpoint neutral 
recording ban statutes, like that in North Dakota, appear to be 
closest to avoiding strict scrutiny under the Otter ruling. 
However, both may be vulnerable to equal protection claims 
because they single out the agricultural industry for protection, 
while others are not. Yet, it would be difficult to apply anything 
except rational basis review, as there is not likely a suspect class 
being discriminated against. The Otter court only applied 
rational basis review, but argued it could apply strict scrutiny if 
the statute was discriminated based on a fundamental right.221 
For states pondering implementing “ag-gag” statutes, these 
would probably be the safest for the states to avoid them being 
challenged. 
But, as a policy matter, states should not implement these 
laws. They are too much of an onerous burden on the right to 
219.  See supra notes 191-199 and accompanying text. 
220.  Pat McCrory, McCrory Veto Message, (May 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/h405Veto/letter.pdf. 
221.  Supra notes 139-53 and accompanying text. 
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free speech, not only of animal rights activists, but news 
gathering in general. The public relies on reporters and their 
ability investigate to inform them of potential wrongdoings. An 
industry that serves public needs, such as the agricultural 
industry, particularly should not be shielded from the public eye. 
The reasons that give rise to “ag-gag” laws are not 
completely unreasonable. It is no doubt a burden for the industry 
to be subject to investigation and public scrutiny. And 
realistically, animal slaughter is a messy and often brutal process 
even when properly done.  Yet, this should not preclude the 
industry from public scrutiny and investigation. These 
investigations continually turn up instances of animal cruelty 
and abuse, which are in fact crimes. It is difficult to reconcile 
why an industry should be immune not only from public 
scrutiny, but from prosecution under laws they have been 
demonstrated to frequently break. And even beyond animal 
cruelty, an industry that produces food for the public should not 
be entirely shielded from it for any number of health concerns. 
What should logically arise from these investigations is more 
transparency, but instead the public is seeing far less. 
